Abstract
The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Information, Coordination, Industrialization, Development, Global Games, Equilibrium Refinements, Big Push |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C3 - Innovationen in Informationstechnologien und Regulierung von Finanzmärkten Volkswirtschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Dynamische Modellierung (aufgelöst) |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C72, C79, D82, F21, O12, O14 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13464-6 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13464 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:10 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
- Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries. (deposited 10. Jul. 2012, 13:10) [momentan angezeigt]