Abstract
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | learning; fictitious play; imitation; reinforcement; trial & error; strategic teaching; Cournot duopoly; experiments; internet |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C4 - Experimentelle Analyse von rationalen und beschränkt rationalen Theorien des Marktverhaltens |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C72, C91, C92, D43, L13 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13487-4 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13487 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:11 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |