Abstract
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals' propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imitation; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C4 - Experimentelle Analyse von rationalen und beschränkt rationalen Theorien des Marktverhaltens |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C72, C91, C92, D43, L13 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13496-8 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13496 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:11 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |