Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence

Apestgeguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen and Oechssler, Jörg (April 2005): Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 54

Abstract

We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals' propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability; Imitation; Cournot markets; Information; Experiments; Simulations
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C4 - Experimentelle Analyse von rationalen und beschränkt rationalen Theorien des Marktverhaltens
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D43, L13
• Language: English