Abstract
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a solitary individual. We describe situations in which the herd and its leader are in conflict and in which the leader bows to the herd’s wish but where this is not to the benefit of the herd.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A6 - Typenvielfalt, Loyalität und die Bildung von Handelsnetzwerken |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13537-2 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 13537 |
| Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012 13:12 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:54 |

