Abstract
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper models the trade-off between production and appropriation in the presence of simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts. The model exhibits a ‘group cohesion effect ’: if the contest between the groups becomes more decisive, or contractual incompleteness between groups becomes more serious, the players devote fewer resources to the intra-group conflict. Moreover, there is also a ‘reversed group cohesion effect’: if the intra-group contests become less decisive, or contractual incompleteness within groups becomes less serious, the players devote more resources to the inter-group contest. The model also sheds new light on normative questions. I derive exact conditions for when dividing individuals in more groups leads to more productive and less appropriative activities. Further, I show that there is an optimal size of the organization which is determined by a trade-off between increasing returns to scale in production and increasing costs of appropriative activities.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Conflict, rent-seeking, federalism, hierarchy |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A2 - Konflikte in Organisations- und Steuerungsproblemen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D72, D74, H11, H74 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13542-9 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13542 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:12 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:54 |