Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders

Szalay, Dezsö (September 2012): Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 386

Abstract

I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of Receiver actions. I provide comparative statics results with respect to the distribution of types for distributions that are comparable in the likelihood ratio order, implying, e.g., that advice from a better informed Sender induces the Receiver to choose actions that are more spread out.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Form of publication: Preprint
• Keywords: strategic information transmission, cheap talk, uniqueness, comparative statics, logconcavity, likelihood ratio order
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A10 - Mehrdimensionale Anreizprobleme, Delegation und Kommunikation
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D82
• Language: English