
Abstract
I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of Receiver actions. I provide comparative statics results with respect to the distribution of types for distributions that are comparable in the likelihood ratio order, implying, e.g., that advice from a better informed Sender induces the Receiver to choose actions that are more spread out.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Form of publication: | Preprint |
Keywords: | strategic information transmission, cheap talk, uniqueness, comparative statics, logconcavity, likelihood ratio order |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A10 - Mehrdimensionale Anreizprobleme, Delegation und Kommunikation |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D82 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14011-6 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 14011 |
Date Deposited: | 18. Sep 2012, 09:18 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:54 |