Abstract
I study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about its cost of producing either of the goods. I explore the ways in which the optimal allocation differs from its one dimensional counterpart. With binding constraints in both dimensions, the allocation involves distortions for the most efficient producers and features overproduction for some less efficient types.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Form of publication: | Preprint |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A10 - Mehrdimensionale Anreizprobleme, Delegation und Kommunikation |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D82, L21 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14770-0 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 14770 |
Date Deposited: | 18. Mar 2013, 11:20 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:55 |