Abstract
Ellsberg (1961) designed a decision experiment where most people violated the axioms of rational choice. He asked people to bet on the outcome of certain random events with known and with unknown probabilities. They usually preferred to bet on events with known probabilities. It is shown that this behavior is reasonable and in accordance with the axioms of rational decision making if it is assumed that people consider bets on events that are repeatedly sampled instead of just sampled once.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Ellsberg's paradox, rational decision making, Sure Thing Principle, subjective probabilities |
Fakultät: | Mathematik, Informatik und Statistik > Statistik > Sonderforschungsbereich 386
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Sonderforschungsbereich 386 |
Themengebiete: | 500 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik > 510 Mathematik |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-1542-6 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 1542 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 04. Apr. 2007 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:45 |