Abstract
Ancient commentators like Ammonius and Boethius tried to solve Aristotle's “sea battle argument” in On Interpretation 9 by saying that statements about future contingents are “indefinitely” true or false. They were followed by al-Fārābī in his commentary on On Interpretation. The article sets out two possible interpretations of what “indefinitely” means here, and shows that al-Fārābī actually has both conceptions: one applied in his interpretation of Aristotle, and another that he is forced into by the problem of divine foreknowledge. It also explains the relevance of al-Fārābī's remarks as a link between the non-statistical modal theories of Philo and Avicenna.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Publikationsform: | Publisher's Version |
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-15825-2 |
ISSN: | 1613-0650 |
Bemerkung: | The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 15825 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2013, 07:38 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:57 |