Abstract
Ancient commentators like Ammonius and Boethius tried to solve Aristotle's “sea battle argument” in On Interpretation 9 by saying that statements about future contingents are “indefinitely” true or false. They were followed by al-Fārābī in his commentary on On Interpretation. The article sets out two possible interpretations of what “indefinitely” means here, and shows that al-Fārābī actually has both conceptions: one applied in his interpretation of Aristotle, and another that he is forced into by the problem of divine foreknowledge. It also explains the relevance of al-Fārābī's remarks as a link between the non-statistical modal theories of Philo and Avicenna.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
| Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-15825-2 |
| ISSN: | 1613-0650 |
| Annotation: | The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 15825 |
| Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2013 07:38 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:57 |

