Optimal Voting Rules

Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen (7. August 2013): Optimal Voting Rules. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 417

Abstract

We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an equivalence between deterministic, DIC mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained-efficient, optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. Optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Form of publication: Preprint
• Faculties: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A3 - Markt- und Auktionsdesign in komplexen Umgebungen
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• Language: English