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Abstract
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer’s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players ‘evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Publikationsform: | Preprint |
| Keywords: | Conflict; Contest; Endogenous fighting; Balance of power; Evolutionary stability |
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A2 - Konflikte in Organisations- und Steuerungsproblemen Volkswirtschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D72, D74 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17244-5 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 17244 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Okt. 2013, 11:15 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:59 |
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