Abstract
This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer’s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players ‘evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Preprint |
| Keywords: | Conflict; Contest; Endogenous fighting; Balance of power; Evolutionary stability |
| Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A2 - Konflikte in Organisations- und Steuerungsproblemen Economics Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D72, D74 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17244-5 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 17244 |
| Date Deposited: | 10. Oct 2013 11:15 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 12:59 |
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