
Abstract
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance’s ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players’ contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Form of publication: | Preprint |
Keywords: | Conflict; Contest; Alliance; Endogenous internal conflict; Hold-up problem; Non-aggression pact; Experiment |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A2 - Konflikte in Organisations- und Steuerungsproblemen Economics Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D72, D74 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17246-6 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 17246 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Oct 2013, 11:57 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:59 |