Download (358kB)
Abstract
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous studies, which focus on perfect investigations. The contrast exists because if precontractual investigation is perfect, the benefits of sequential screening vanish.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Principal agent, information acquisition, sequential screening |
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | D82, D83, D86 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17334-5 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 17334 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 23. Okt. 2013, 13:48 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:59 |
- Dokument bearbeiten
