Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency’s optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and future consequences and incentives are taken into account.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Asymmetric information, Dual sourcing, Favoritism, Financial constraints, Procurement. |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C6 - Kommunikations- und Transporttechnologien, Industrie- und Regionalstruktur |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D82, G30, H57 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17402-3 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 17402 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 30. Okt. 2013, 15:42 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:59 |