
Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency’s optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and future consequences and incentives are taken into account.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Asymmetric information, Dual sourcing, Favoritism, Financial constraints, Procurement. |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C6 - Kommunikations- und Transporttechnologien, Industrie- und Regionalstruktur |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D82, G30, H57 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17402-3 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 17402 |
Date Deposited: | 30. Oct 2013, 15:42 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:59 |