Abstract
Earlier studies show that contracts under subjective performance evaluation are dichotomous and punish only worst performance. I show that with limited liability payments need not be binary. More importantly, if the agent earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes only signals of good news and bad news of the agent’s action.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | bonus, monotone likelihood ratio, wage compression |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D82, M52, M54 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17411-3 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 17411 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 05. Nov. 2013, 14:31 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:59 |