Abstract
Earlier studies show that contracts under subjective performance evaluation are dichotomous and punish only worst performance. I show that with limited liability payments need not be binary. More importantly, if the agent earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes only signals of good news and bad news of the agent’s action.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper | 
|---|---|
| Keywords: | bonus, monotone likelihood ratio, wage compression | 
| Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
		 Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance  | 
        
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft | 
| JEL Classification: | D82, M52, M54 | 
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17411-3 | 
| Sprache: | Englisch | 
| Dokumenten ID: | 17411 | 
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 05. Nov. 2013 14:31 | 
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 12:59 | 
		
	
