Abstract
If intelligent design (id) is to compete with evolutionary theory (et), it must meet the modified falsifiability challenge, that is, make some deductive or probabilistic observational assertions. It must also meet the modified translatability challenge, which it fails if et makes all the observational assertions of id, while id does not make all the observational assertions of et. I discuss four prominent but diverse formulations of id and show that each either fails one of the two challenges or is analytically false
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Science |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
ISSN: | 1572-8420 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 17426 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 08. Nov. 2013, 10:56 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:59 |