Abstract
We analyze distributional preferences in games in which a decider chooses the provision of a good that benefits a receiver and creates costs for a group of payers. The average decider takes into account the welfare of all parties and has concerns for efficiency. However, she attaches similar weights to small and large groups so that she neglects large provision costs that are dispersed among many payers. This holds regardless of whether the decider benefits from the provision or not. A CES utility function which rationalizes average behavior implies altruism in bilateral situations and welfare-damaging actions when costs are dispersed.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Social Preferences, Distribution Games, Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B5 - Weltwirtschaftliche Integration und die neue Firmenorganisation Volkswirtschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C91, D63, H00 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-18058-8 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 18058 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 22. Jan. 2014, 14:59 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:59 |