Government strength, power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in OECD-countries. A voting power approach

Huber, Gerald; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias (September 2003): Government strength, power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in OECD-countries. A voting power approach. In: Public Choice, Vol. 116, No. 3-4: pp. 333-350

Abstract

We test for the influence of government strength and dispersion of power among the parties of coalition governments on the size of annual debt accumulation through budget deficits in OECD-countries from 1970 to 1999. Government strength and power dispersion in coalition governments are measured by the Banzhaf index of voting power, respectively the standard deviation of Banzhaf indices of coalition parties. We believe that these are better-suited proxies than most of what has been applied so far. Government strength turns out to be insignificant. However, coalitions with equally strong partners run significantly higher deficits than coalitions with one dominating party.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• ISSN: 1573-7101
• Language: English