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Abstract
One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is 'discrimination' between the two agents and that the available information for agents determines the extent of this discrimination, even though the theoretical solution of the game implies equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against react negatively by withholding effort.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C72, C91, D21, J31 |
ISSN: | 0927-5371 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 18169 |
Date Deposited: | 06. Feb 2014, 15:28 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:59 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28)
- Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28) [Currently Displayed]