

Abstract
While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various sources of the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | experiment; dictator game; team behavior; social preferences |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of Empirical Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C72, C91, C92, D70 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-18194-7 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 18194 |
Date Deposited: | 06. Feb 2014, 15:28 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:59 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered. (deposited 06. Feb 2014, 15:28) [Currently Displayed]