Abstract
The philosophical discussion about logical constants has only recently moved into the substructural era. While philosophers have spent a lot of time discussing the meaning of logical constants in the context of classical versus intuitionistic logic, very little has been said about the introduction of substruc-tural connectives. Linear logic, affine logic and other substructural logics offer a more fine-grained perspective on basic connectives such as conjunction and disjunction, a perspective which I believe will also shed light on debates in the philosophy of logic. In what follows I will look at one particularly interesting instance of this: The development of the position known as logical inferentialism in view of substructural connectives. I claim that sensitivity to structural properties is an interesting challenge to logical inferentialism, and that it ultimately requires revision of core notions in the inferentialist litera-ture. Specifically, I want to argue that current definitions of proof theoretic harmony give rise to problematic nonconservativeness as a result of their insensitivity to substructurality. These nonconservativeness results are undesirable because they make it impossible to consistently add logical constants that are of independent philosophical interest.
Dokumententyp: | Buchbeitrag |
---|---|
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
ISBN: | 978-1-84890-086-8 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 18401 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 02. Mrz. 2014, 10:24 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016, 09:15 |