Abstract
The Fitch paradox poses a serious challenge for anti-realism. This paper investigates the option for an anti-realist to answer the challenge by restricting the knowability principle. Based on a critical discussion of Dummett’s and Tennant’s suggestions for a restriction desiderata for a principled solution are developed. In the second part of the paper a different restriction is proposed. The proposal uses the notion of uniform formulas and diagnoses the problem arising in the case of Moore sentences in the different status propositional letters receive. The new proposal is able to avoid some of the criticism on its predecessors.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Keywords: | Fitch’s paradox; Knowability principle; Restriction strategy; Uniform sentences |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 19058 |
Date Deposited: | 28. May 2014, 06:30 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:00 |