Abstract
Common sense arguments are practically always about incomplete and uncertain information. We distinguish two aspects or kinds of uncertainty. The one is defined as a persons’ uncertainty about the truth of a sentence. The other uncertainty is defined as a persons’ uncertainty of his assessment of the truth of a sentence. In everyday life argumentation we are often faced with both kinds of uncertainty which should be distinguished to avoid misunderstandings among discussants. The paper presents a probabilistic account of both kinds of uncertainty in the framework of coherence. Furthermore, intuitions about the evaluation of the strength of arguments are explored. Both reasoning about uncertainty and the development of a theory of argument strength are central for a realistic theory of rational argumentation.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Keywords: | coherence, probability, uncertainty, argument strength |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Epistemology |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 120 Epistemology |
Place of Publication: | Wien |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 19086 |
Date Deposited: | 28. May 2014, 06:36 |
Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016, 09:16 |