Meier, Volker (2013): One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing. In: Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, Vol. 110, No. 2: pp. 181-186 |
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Abstract
We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair for Public Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 19181 |
Deposited On: | 15. Apr 2014 08:48 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:00 |
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One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 08:48)
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