
Abstract
In long-term private health insurance contracts, aging provisions are used to flatten premium profiles. An individual would like to change insurers if she perceives a low service quality. The first-best optimum is characterized by provision transfers which are higher for high risks and may be negative for low risks. Should the actual risk status not be verifiable, provision transfers have to be uniform. Efficient transfers will equalize consumption across periods and states if high risks are deterred from switching. Otherwise, the optimum transfer balances the distortions of incentives for high-risk and low-risk individuals.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair for Public Economics |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 19186 |
| Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014 08:48 |
| Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:16 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Efficient Transfer of Aging Provisions in Private Health Insurance. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 08:48) [Currently Displayed]
