Political Parties and Rent-seeking through Networks

Miettinen, Topi und Poutvaara, Panu (2006): Political Parties and Rent-seeking through Networks.

Abstract

We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of non-ideological political nominations. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in nominations made by politicians. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians, thereby becoming potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft ; Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > CESifo-Professur für Vergleichende Institutionenökonomik
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• Sprache: Englisch