|Miettinen, Topi; Poutvaara, Panu (2006): Political Parties and Rent-seeking through Networks.|
We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of non-ideological political nominations. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in nominations made by politicians. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians, thereby becoming potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.
Economics > Chairs > CESifo-Professorship for International Institutional Comparisons
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||15. Apr 2014 08:49|
|Last Modified:||29. Apr 2016 09:16|