Abstract
Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-. k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from that in equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions; hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to that in equilibrium play. We argue that time pressure evokes intuitive reasoning and reduces the focal attraction of choosing higher (and per se more profitable) numbers in the game.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 19234 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:00 |