Abstract
In this paper we analyze the conditions under which a foreign direct investment (FDI) involves a net capital flow across countries. For this purpose, we investigate how multinational firms finance their foreign affiliates, globally or locally. We develop a contract theoretical model in which the financing structure is used to govern the incentives of managers. We find that the investment tends to be financed locally if managerial incentive problems are large. Thus, microeconomic governance problems may have macroeconomic implications for the net capital flow to host countries. Our results are consistent with survey data on German and Austrian investment flows of firms to Eastern Europe.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of International Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Comparative Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 19257 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 08:49 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:00 |