Abstract
Since the fall of communism, the former Soviet Union experienced a strong output decline and a dramatic increase in arrears and barter. We develop a model which explains how these three phenomena are connected. We introduce liquidity and credit constraints into a model of disorganization and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter creates a hostage that allows to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement becomes prohibitively costly. Based on a firm survey in Ukraine in 1997, we test how input shortages, financial shortages and barter affect output growth of firms.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Komparative Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 19258 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:00 |