Abstract
Since the fall of communism, the former Soviet Union experienced a strong output decline and a dramatic increase in arrears and barter. We develop a model which explains how these three phenomena are connected. We introduce liquidity and credit constraints into a model of disorganization and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter creates a hostage that allows to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement becomes prohibitively costly. Based on a firm survey in Ukraine in 1997, we test how input shortages, financial shortages and barter affect output growth of firms.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair of International Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Comparative Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 19258 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 08:49 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:00 |