Abstract
I analyze a two-period model in which risk-averse students divide their time between risky education, leisure, and work. The educated can migrate. Wage-tax financed transfer to students acts as an insurance, and increases both human capital investment and demand for leisure. I derive sufficient conditions for tax competition to lead to inefficiently low wage tax rates. I suggest that the educated should pay their wage taxes to the region which has financed their education. I show that this would increase taxation and human capital investment, and would also benefit the owners of the complementary factor.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > CESifo-Professorship for International Institutional Comparisons |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 19302 |
| Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014 08:49 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:00 |
