|Poutvaara, Panu (2001): Alternative tax constitutions and risky education in a federation. In: Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 31, Nr. 2-3: S. 355-377|
I analyze a two-period model in which risk-averse students divide their time between risky education, leisure, and work. The educated can migrate. Wage-tax financed transfer to students acts as an insurance, and increases both human capital investment and demand for leisure. I derive sufficient conditions for tax competition to lead to inefficiently low wage tax rates. I suggest that the educated should pay their wage taxes to the region which has financed their education. I show that this would increase taxation and human capital investment, and would also benefit the owners of the complementary factor.
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > CESifo-Professur für Vergleichende Institutionenökonomik
|Themengebiete:||300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft|
|Veröffentlicht am:||15. Apr. 2014 08:49|
|Letzte Änderungen:||29. Apr. 2016 09:16|