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Nöldeke, Georg; Schmidt, Klaus M. (1997): Sequential Investments and Options to Own. Discussion Paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 1645
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This paper analyses the investment incentives given by contingent ownership structures that are prevalent in joint ventures. We consider a variation of the standard hold-up problem where two parties make relationship-specific investments sequentially in order to generate a joint surplus in the future. In many interesting cases, including investments in human and in physical capital, the following ownership structure implements first-best investments: one party owns the firm initially, while the other party has the option to buy the firm at a set price at a later date. This result is robust to the possibility of renegotiation and uncertainty. ; Incomplete Contracts; Options and Convertible Securities; Property Rights

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