Abstract
Frequently, international environmental negotiations have been analyzed in two-agent (2 × 2) games. Yet, in order to involve additional strategies, (3 × 3) games gained attention recently. We employ such a (3 × 3) game setting in order to depict international negotiations on climate change and integrate both the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken games in this setting. We analyze transitions of negotiation states and describe how ancillary benefits and first-mover advantages influence agents’ behavior in the negotiations, when three different strategies or levels of climate protection efforts are available. Finally, we also integrate strategies to mitigate and to adapt to climate change into the analysis in the (3 × 3) game setting.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | 2-Person games; Adaptation; Ancillary benefits; Climate change; First-mover advantage; International negotiations; Chicken game; Prisoner’s dilemma game |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > CESifo-Professur für Energie, Klima |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 19343 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:50 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:00 |
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