ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2460-619X
(2012):
Fairness and cheating.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 56, Nr. 8: S. 1645-1655
Dies ist die neueste Version des Dokumentes.
Abstract
We present evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that individuals who believe they were treated unfairly in an interaction with another person are more likely to cheat in a subsequent unrelated game. Specifically, subjects first participated in a dictator game. They then flipped a coin in private and reported the outcome. Subjects could increase their total payoff by cheating, i.e., lying about the outcome of the coin toss. We found that subjects were more likely to cheat in reporting the outcome of the coin flip when: (1) they received either nothing or a very small transfer from the dictator; and (2) they claimed to have been treated unfairly.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 19375 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014 08:50 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:01 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
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Fairness and Cheating. (deposited 10. Jul. 2012 13:06)
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Fairness and Cheating. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014 08:50)
- Fairness and cheating. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014 08:50) [momentan angezeigt]
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Fairness and Cheating. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014 08:50)