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Abstract
Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budget institutions. It develops a two period model of a federation consisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type of regions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution with lax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self selection problem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regarding exogenous characteristics of the regions.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Lehrstuhl für Finanzwissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 19390 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:50 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:01 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
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Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014, 08:50)
- Interregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric information. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014, 08:50) [momentan angezeigt]