| Holzner, Christian; Meier, Volker; Werding, Martin (2006): Workfare, monitoring, and efficiency wages. CESifo Working Paper, 1749 |
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External fulltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25794
Abstract
The impact of a stronger work requirement for welfare recipients in a workfare program is studied in an efficiency wage model where a representative firm chooses its level of monitoring activities. A stricter workfare policy raises employment and monitoring activities. It typically increases profits and reduces the tax rate. The impact on the net wage is ambiguous. Utility levels of employed workers and welfare recipients may increase even if the net wage declines. The utility differential between these two groups of workers shrinks.
| Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair in Public Finance Economics > Chairs > Chair for Public Economics |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 19409 |
| Deposited On: | 15. Apr 2014 08:50 |
| Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:16 |
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