|Kesternich, Iris; Schumacher, Heiner (2014): On the Use of Information in Oligopolistic Insurance Markets. In: Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 81, No. 1: pp. 159-175|
We analyze the use of information in an oligopolistic insurance market with costly market entry. For intermediate values of entry costs, an equilibrium exists that is profit maximizing for incumbents and in which companies do not discriminate between high and low risks. The model therefore provides an explanation for the existence of \"unused observables,\" that is, information that (1) insurance companies collect or could collect, (2) is correlated with risk, but (3) is not used to set premiums.
Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Comparative Economics
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||15. Apr 2014 08:51|
|Last Modified:||29. Apr 2016 09:16|