Dies ist die neueste Version des Dokumentes.
Abstract
In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves- Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically efficient. While introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to achieve a perfect internalization.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Lehrstuhl für Nationalökonomie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 19480 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:51 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:01 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
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Intra-generational externalities and intergenerational transfers. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014, 08:51)
- Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers. (deposited 15. Apr. 2014, 08:51) [momentan angezeigt]