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Kolmar, Martin und Meier, Volker (2012): Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers. In: Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Bd. 11, Nr. 4: S. 531-548

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Abstract

In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves- Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically efficient. While introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to achieve a perfect internalization.

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