Kolmar, Martin; Meier, Volker (2012): Intragenerational externalities and intergenerational transfers. In: Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Vol. 11, No. 4: pp. 531-548 |
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
In an environment with asymmetric information and intragenerational externalities, the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves- Vickrey mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can be covered in every generation only if the initial allocation is not dynamically efficient. While introducing a pay-as-you-go scheme without addressing the externality already yields a Pareto improvement, further welfare gains can be captured by using the additional resources to achieve a perfect internalization.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Chair for Public Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
ID Code: | 19480 |
Deposited On: | 15. Apr 2014 08:51 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:01 |
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Intra-generational externalities and intergenerational transfers. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 08:51)
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