Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

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Schmidt, Klaus M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828 und Fehr, Ernst (June 2004): Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model. Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich,

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Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.

External fulltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.5167/uzh-52087

Item Type:	Paper
Faculties:	Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Theory
Subjects:	300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Language:	English
Item ID:	19764
Date Deposited:	15. Apr 2014 08:53
Last Modified:	29. Apr 2016 09:17

Available Versions of this Item

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 09:01)
- Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model. (deposited 13. Apr 2005)
  - Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 08:53) [Currently Displayed]
    - Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 09:01)

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