Schmidt, Klaus M.  ORCID: 0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
Incomplete contracts and privatization.
In: European Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 3-5: pp. 569-579
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Full text not available from 'Open Access LMU'.
External fulltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3VW8NC3-H/2/82ad5c978fea1c7ac65610334066bed3
Abstract
The paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization. Furthermore, a simple model of privatization to an owner-manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in turn affect allocative and productive efficiency. In this model, privatization is a commitment device of the government to credibly reward the manager for a successful cost reduction and to harden his budget constraint.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Theory |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 19776 |
| Deposited On: | 15. Apr 2014 08:53 |
| Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:17 |
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