Schmidt, Klaus M.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(1996):
Incomplete contracts and privatization.
In: European Economic Review, Bd. 40, Nr. 3-5: S. 569-579
Externer Volltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3VW8NC3-H/2/82ad5c978fea1c7ac65610334066bed3
Abstract
The paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization. Furthermore, a simple model of privatization to an owner-manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in turn affect allocative and productive efficiency. In this model, privatization is a commitment device of the government to credibly reward the manager for a successful cost reduction and to harden his budget constraint.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 19776 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 15. Apr. 2014, 08:53 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Apr. 2016, 09:17 |
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