Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game

Schmidt, Klaus M. (1993): Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game. In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 60, No. 1: pp. 114-139

Abstract

This paper analyzes a finitely repeated bargaining game with asymmetric information. It gives a tight characterization of the equilibrium path and the equilibrium payoffs of all sequential equilibria satisfying a weak Markov property. The method used allows for arbitrarily many different types and provides an intuitive understanding of how \"reputation\" works. It is shown that the seller can use the incomplete information about his costs to credibly threaten never to accept a price lower than his highest possible costs before the very end of the game. The result holds for any discount factor of the seller greater than 0.5. Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, D83.

• Item Type: Journal article
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Theory
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• Language: English