Abstract
It may be in the interest of low-ability individuals to subsidize theeducation of high-ability individuals. The sufficient conditions aresurprisingly mild: positive externalities in education andcomplementarity in production between human capital and labor suppliedby the low-ability individuals. However, tax competition and the freemobility of the educated give rise to time-inconsistency and free-ridingproblems which render such a social contract infeasible and result in asuboptimally low investment in education.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > CESifo-Professorship for International Institutional Comparisons |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 19797 |
| Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014 08:53 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:01 |
